The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps

The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps


The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual [Reading] ➻ The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Author David H. Petraeus – Capitalsoftworks.co.uk When the US military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with When the US military invaded States Army eBook ↠ Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them It is fair to say that in , most Army officers knew about the US Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency The US Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void The result of unprecedented collaboration among top US military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, The United PDF \ the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations sometimes the you protect your forces, the less secure you are sometimes the force you use, the less effective it is sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction An new introduction by United States Army Kindle Ï Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional US military doctrineAn attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of and the new world of international terrorism, The US Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private public partnership that supports the families of America s injured servicemen To learn about the Fisher House Foundation, visit fisherhouse.


10 thoughts on “The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

  1. Steven Peterson Steven Peterson says:

    The context for this important work John Nagl s Foreword, Page xiii .the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it In the Introduction, Sarah Sewall observes the critical point of counterinsurgency COIN Page xxiii .although it is military doctrine, the field manual emphasizes the multiple dimensions of COIN those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a The context for this important work John Nagl s Foreword, Page xiii .the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it In the Introduction, Sarah Sewall observes the critical point of counterinsurgency COIN Page xxiii .although it is military doctrine, the field manual emphasizes the multiple dimensions of COIN those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency Traditional US COIN policy was unwisely military only ignoring the many other dimensions Obviously, one of the most arresting features of this volume is one of its authors General David Petraeus At the outset, this book emphasizes the competitive learning struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent The manual says that Page lii .the side that learns faster and adaptsrapidly the better learning organization usually wins The first chapter explores insurgency and counterinsurgency, concluding with a series of lessons for governments as they take on an insurgency Page 51 features a Table outlining successful operational practices e.g., emphasize intelligence, isolate insurgents from the population, protect key infrastructure, provide amnesty for those willing to support the new government and those that are not normally successful e.g., overemphasizing killing and capturing the enemy as opposed to engaging the populace as a whole, ignore peacetime processes, including legal procedures The first chapter also features a number of pithy points that might seem counterintuitive e.g., if a tactic works this week, it might not work next week sometime doing nothing is the best reaction Other key chapters focus on the need to have unity between civilian and military activities counterinsurgency fails if it is carried out as a military approach only , the requirement for good intelligence, leadership and ethics in counterinsurgency Some of theinteresting aspects of this book are located in the several appendices One focuses on the support of linguists in COIN intriguing, too, is a section on legal considerations in COIN For some readers, this might be uncomfortable reading, given its focus on warfare On the other hand, COIN is a reality and a method for combating insurgencies The book is pretty well written for the most part, it is also clearly written It is fascinating to see the author rise in the ranks, partly as a result of his perspective as laid out in this work


  2. Daniel Daniel says:

    A great book, and a phenomenal update on the manual Petraeus fully deserves his reputation Not a ripping yarn, of course but incorporates well and surprisingly concisely a lot of recent research on insurgencies, including all too rare discussions of the importance of information operations e.g., media , overall strategic planning, and network analysis My only quibble is that the network analysis appendix focuses almost exclusively on intelligence gathering, and does not discuss potential A great book, and a phenomenal update on the manual Petraeus fully deserves his reputation Not a ripping yarn, of course but incorporates well and surprisingly concisely a lot of recent research on insurgencies, including all too rare discussions of the importance of information operations e.g., media , overall strategic planning, and network analysis My only quibble is that the network analysis appendix focuses almost exclusively on intelligence gathering, and does not discuss potential impacts of counterinsurgency carried through social networks


  3. Jennifer Jennifer says:

    Did this really work out for us Really


  4. David Watts David Watts says:

    My 16th of 78 books on Gen Mattis reading list I read Kilcullens Counterinsurgency before this, realizing now I should have read this first as this is for leaders and planners at the battalion level and above, while Kilcullen addresses at the small unit level I thought the section on Social Network Analysis was the most noteworthy.


  5. Brianna Herndon-Sotelo Brianna Herndon-Sotelo says:

    What a piece of colonial work.


  6. Alan Alan says:

    OK, this is very geeky I did some academic study of counter insurgency as part of my War Studies course back in 1979, and I ve read one or two things since then I picked this up in the US on our recent trip.Co authored by General Patraeus this book is the official US Army and Marine Corps doctrine for counter insurgency Whether the US Army and Marine Corps can implement it fully is a major question, because it requires rather different force struct OK, this is very geeky I did some academic study of counter insurgency as part of my War Studies course back in 1979, and I ve read one or two things since then I picked this up in the US on our recent trip.Co authored by General Patraeus this book is the official US Army and Marine Corps doctrine for counter insurgency Whether the US Army and Marine Corps can implement it fully is a major question, because it requires rather different force structures than currently exist in those organisations.The book is a major development of counter insurgency doctrine, building on British, French and US doctrines since WW2 It stresses the holistic nature of counter insurgency and discusses at length and in practical detail how to do hearts and minds activities, with major emphasis on intelligence gathering and the placement of combat operations within the social, economic and political context of counter insurgency.As this is an army manual, it does not discuss the rights and wrongs of any specific counter insurgency campaign So its starting point assumes that the counter insurgency campaign is justified that s a political and ethical, rather than a military question It recognised implicitly the failure of the US approach to Iraq and Afghanistan up to at least late 2006, and frankly admits that the US military had avoided learning the lessons of the Vietnam war It then lays out the new techniques to be implemented in future, echoing a lot of the content of Frank Kitson s Low Intensity Operations , and drawing together civil and military activities, intelligence, design and execution of operations, developing host nation security forces, leadership and ethics, and logistics.The book reflects, surprisingly to me, the application of systems thinking techniques to counter insurgency warfare And by the way, it s also a useful manual for insurgents too the other side of the COIN


  7. Anthony Anthony says:

    A must read for anyone in the military or any civilian trying to understand the complexities of counterinsurgency I enjoyed the introductions from well respected military and non military experts on this topic These quickly seek to introduce a new way of thinking and analysing an old tactic of war in the modern era The chapters referencing the paradoxes of counterinsurgency warfare are the most useful and each interesting bullet makes the reader really think about the problems at hand and how A must read for anyone in the military or any civilian trying to understand the complexities of counterinsurgency I enjoyed the introductions from well respected military and non military experts on this topic These quickly seek to introduce a new way of thinking and analysing an old tactic of war in the modern era The chapters referencing the paradoxes of counterinsurgency warfare are the most useful and each interesting bullet makes the reader really think about the problems at hand and how to approach the myriad of situations which occur on the battlefield.I liked the focus of this manual centering on winning the support of the population and not merely killing the insurgents The military is needed for security so that economic development can take place The quote by JFK sums up the difficulties for a soldier operating in this type of environment when he said, You military professionals must know something about strategy and tactics andlogistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power You must understand that few of the important problems of your timehave finally solved by military power alone There is plenty of great advice taken from lessons learned during the recent conflicts and some from the past This book highlights the main topics and high level strategy for counter insurgent warfare yet this should just be a gateway to other books about this topic Anyone who is interested in American strategy in likely conflicts during the next 50 years should read this and take the lessons to heart At the very least I think the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved to politicians that military might alone is not enough to win a war and muchthought and preparation for economic stability must be considered before American soldiers are asked to occupy foreign land


  8. Shawn Shawn says:

    Fascinating sections on social network analysis but the veterans know some things can t be learned from a manual In the back of my mind, military manuals marketed as mainstream bestsellers seems sanitized for public consumption and to avoid political fallout FM 31 20 3 Foreign Internal Defense Tactics from 1994 has acynical and in my opinion, realistic view of occupation and guerrilla psychology Moreover, manuals are by their very nature abstract and concepts and theories need to be b Fascinating sections on social network analysis but the veterans know some things can t be learned from a manual In the back of my mind, military manuals marketed as mainstream bestsellers seems sanitized for public consumption and to avoid political fallout FM 31 20 3 Foreign Internal Defense Tactics from 1994 has acynical and in my opinion, realistic view of occupation and guerrilla psychology Moreover, manuals are by their very nature abstract and concepts and theories need to be backed up by past experiences While excellent examples from history are explored in capsules and sidenotes, commanders who handle the political side would be better served by hard study of how narcs recruit informers and how mafiosi clans vie for influence


  9. Rachel Brune Rachel Brune says:

    I m not sure how such a hotly contested tome was ultimately so boring oh wait, it s military doctrine My purpose in reading was to be able to join informed conversation re COIN vs NO COIN There was good information in here, although much of it was pretty theoretical Possibly because the successful application of COIN doctrine I said the SUCCESSful application, people is still theoretical I am glad to have read it, as the debate continues Like some buddies of mine and I were discuss I m not sure how such a hotly contested tome was ultimately so boring oh wait, it s military doctrine My purpose in reading was to be able to join informed conversation re COIN vs NO COIN There was good information in here, although much of it was pretty theoretical Possibly because the successful application of COIN doctrine I said the SUCCESSful application, people is still theoretical I am glad to have read it, as the debate continues Like some buddies of mine and I were discussing, as long as there are insurgencies, there will still be a need for counterinsurgency, even if we re not that good at it


  10. Fred Fred says:

    I read this about five years ago and wish that it was current enough in my memory that I could write a detailed description but alas, I cannot I do remember that I liked it and feel like I learned a lot from reading it straight through I would highly recommend it to anyone and I think that it s one that officers and NCOs should definitely own a copy of.


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10 thoughts on “The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

  1. Steven Peterson Steven Peterson says:

    The context for this important work John Nagl s Foreword, Page xiii .the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it In the Introduction, Sarah Sewall observes the critical point of counterinsurgency COIN Page xxiii .although it is military doctrine, the field manual emphasizes the multiple dimensions of COIN those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a The context for this important work John Nagl s Foreword, Page xiii .the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it In the Introduction, Sarah Sewall observes the critical point of counterinsurgency COIN Page xxiii .although it is military doctrine, the field manual emphasizes the multiple dimensions of COIN those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency Traditional US COIN policy was unwisely military only ignoring the many other dimensions Obviously, one of the most arresting features of this volume is one of its authors General David Petraeus At the outset, this book emphasizes the competitive learning struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent The manual says that Page lii .the side that learns faster and adaptsrapidly the better learning organization usually wins The first chapter explores insurgency and counterinsurgency, concluding with a series of lessons for governments as they take on an insurgency Page 51 features a Table outlining successful operational practices e.g., emphasize intelligence, isolate insurgents from the population, protect key infrastructure, provide amnesty for those willing to support the new government and those that are not normally successful e.g., overemphasizing killing and capturing the enemy as opposed to engaging the populace as a whole, ignore peacetime processes, including legal procedures The first chapter also features a number of pithy points that might seem counterintuitive e.g., if a tactic works this week, it might not work next week sometime doing nothing is the best reaction Other key chapters focus on the need to have unity between civilian and military activities counterinsurgency fails if it is carried out as a military approach only , the requirement for good intelligence, leadership and ethics in counterinsurgency Some of theinteresting aspects of this book are located in the several appendices One focuses on the support of linguists in COIN intriguing, too, is a section on legal considerations in COIN For some readers, this might be uncomfortable reading, given its focus on warfare On the other hand, COIN is a reality and a method for combating insurgencies The book is pretty well written for the most part, it is also clearly written It is fascinating to see the author rise in the ranks, partly as a result of his perspective as laid out in this work

  2. Daniel Daniel says:

    A great book, and a phenomenal update on the manual Petraeus fully deserves his reputation Not a ripping yarn, of course but incorporates well and surprisingly concisely a lot of recent research on insurgencies, including all too rare discussions of the importance of information operations e.g., media , overall strategic planning, and network analysis My only quibble is that the network analysis appendix focuses almost exclusively on intelligence gathering, and does not discuss potential A great book, and a phenomenal update on the manual Petraeus fully deserves his reputation Not a ripping yarn, of course but incorporates well and surprisingly concisely a lot of recent research on insurgencies, including all too rare discussions of the importance of information operations e.g., media , overall strategic planning, and network analysis My only quibble is that the network analysis appendix focuses almost exclusively on intelligence gathering, and does not discuss potential impacts of counterinsurgency carried through social networks

  3. Jennifer Jennifer says:

    Did this really work out for us Really

  4. David Watts David Watts says:

    My 16th of 78 books on Gen Mattis reading list I read Kilcullens Counterinsurgency before this, realizing now I should have read this first as this is for leaders and planners at the battalion level and above, while Kilcullen addresses at the small unit level I thought the section on Social Network Analysis was the most noteworthy.

  5. Brianna Herndon-Sotelo Brianna Herndon-Sotelo says:

    What a piece of colonial work.

  6. Alan Alan says:

    OK, this is very geeky I did some academic study of counter insurgency as part of my War Studies course back in 1979, and I ve read one or two things since then I picked this up in the US on our recent trip.Co authored by General Patraeus this book is the official US Army and Marine Corps doctrine for counter insurgency Whether the US Army and Marine Corps can implement it fully is a major question, because it requires rather different force struct OK, this is very geeky I did some academic study of counter insurgency as part of my War Studies course back in 1979, and I ve read one or two things since then I picked this up in the US on our recent trip.Co authored by General Patraeus this book is the official US Army and Marine Corps doctrine for counter insurgency Whether the US Army and Marine Corps can implement it fully is a major question, because it requires rather different force structures than currently exist in those organisations.The book is a major development of counter insurgency doctrine, building on British, French and US doctrines since WW2 It stresses the holistic nature of counter insurgency and discusses at length and in practical detail how to do hearts and minds activities, with major emphasis on intelligence gathering and the placement of combat operations within the social, economic and political context of counter insurgency.As this is an army manual, it does not discuss the rights and wrongs of any specific counter insurgency campaign So its starting point assumes that the counter insurgency campaign is justified that s a political and ethical, rather than a military question It recognised implicitly the failure of the US approach to Iraq and Afghanistan up to at least late 2006, and frankly admits that the US military had avoided learning the lessons of the Vietnam war It then lays out the new techniques to be implemented in future, echoing a lot of the content of Frank Kitson s Low Intensity Operations , and drawing together civil and military activities, intelligence, design and execution of operations, developing host nation security forces, leadership and ethics, and logistics.The book reflects, surprisingly to me, the application of systems thinking techniques to counter insurgency warfare And by the way, it s also a useful manual for insurgents too the other side of the COIN

  7. Anthony Anthony says:

    A must read for anyone in the military or any civilian trying to understand the complexities of counterinsurgency I enjoyed the introductions from well respected military and non military experts on this topic These quickly seek to introduce a new way of thinking and analysing an old tactic of war in the modern era The chapters referencing the paradoxes of counterinsurgency warfare are the most useful and each interesting bullet makes the reader really think about the problems at hand and how A must read for anyone in the military or any civilian trying to understand the complexities of counterinsurgency I enjoyed the introductions from well respected military and non military experts on this topic These quickly seek to introduce a new way of thinking and analysing an old tactic of war in the modern era The chapters referencing the paradoxes of counterinsurgency warfare are the most useful and each interesting bullet makes the reader really think about the problems at hand and how to approach the myriad of situations which occur on the battlefield.I liked the focus of this manual centering on winning the support of the population and not merely killing the insurgents The military is needed for security so that economic development can take place The quote by JFK sums up the difficulties for a soldier operating in this type of environment when he said, You military professionals must know something about strategy and tactics andlogistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power You must understand that few of the important problems of your timehave finally solved by military power alone There is plenty of great advice taken from lessons learned during the recent conflicts and some from the past This book highlights the main topics and high level strategy for counter insurgent warfare yet this should just be a gateway to other books about this topic Anyone who is interested in American strategy in likely conflicts during the next 50 years should read this and take the lessons to heart At the very least I think the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved to politicians that military might alone is not enough to win a war and muchthought and preparation for economic stability must be considered before American soldiers are asked to occupy foreign land

  8. Shawn Shawn says:

    Fascinating sections on social network analysis but the veterans know some things can t be learned from a manual In the back of my mind, military manuals marketed as mainstream bestsellers seems sanitized for public consumption and to avoid political fallout FM 31 20 3 Foreign Internal Defense Tactics from 1994 has acynical and in my opinion, realistic view of occupation and guerrilla psychology Moreover, manuals are by their very nature abstract and concepts and theories need to be b Fascinating sections on social network analysis but the veterans know some things can t be learned from a manual In the back of my mind, military manuals marketed as mainstream bestsellers seems sanitized for public consumption and to avoid political fallout FM 31 20 3 Foreign Internal Defense Tactics from 1994 has acynical and in my opinion, realistic view of occupation and guerrilla psychology Moreover, manuals are by their very nature abstract and concepts and theories need to be backed up by past experiences While excellent examples from history are explored in capsules and sidenotes, commanders who handle the political side would be better served by hard study of how narcs recruit informers and how mafiosi clans vie for influence

  9. Rachel Brune Rachel Brune says:

    I m not sure how such a hotly contested tome was ultimately so boring oh wait, it s military doctrine My purpose in reading was to be able to join informed conversation re COIN vs NO COIN There was good information in here, although much of it was pretty theoretical Possibly because the successful application of COIN doctrine I said the SUCCESSful application, people is still theoretical I am glad to have read it, as the debate continues Like some buddies of mine and I were discuss I m not sure how such a hotly contested tome was ultimately so boring oh wait, it s military doctrine My purpose in reading was to be able to join informed conversation re COIN vs NO COIN There was good information in here, although much of it was pretty theoretical Possibly because the successful application of COIN doctrine I said the SUCCESSful application, people is still theoretical I am glad to have read it, as the debate continues Like some buddies of mine and I were discussing, as long as there are insurgencies, there will still be a need for counterinsurgency, even if we re not that good at it

  10. Fred Fred says:

    I read this about five years ago and wish that it was current enough in my memory that I could write a detailed description but alas, I cannot I do remember that I liked it and feel like I learned a lot from reading it straight through I would highly recommend it to anyone and I think that it s one that officers and NCOs should definitely own a copy of.

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